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Abstract
It is frequently argued that unemployment plays a crucial role for the occurrence of right-
wing extremist crimes. We empirically test this hypothesis using data from Germany. We
nd that right-wing criminal activities occur more frequently when unemployment is high.
The big dierence in right-wing crime between East and West German states can mostly
be attributed to dierences in unemployment. This nding reinforces the importance of
unemployment as an explanatory factor for right-wing crime and questions explanations
based solely on the dierent socialization in former communist East Germany and the
liberal West German states.
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11 Introduction
Right-wing extremism is a serious problem in many societies. Germany, for example, has
witnessed several fatal assaults against foreigners.1 While these assaults have received a lot of
attention they are just the most severe examples of crimes with a racist, xenophobic, and/or
antisemitic background (henceforth right-wing extremist crimes). For instance, more than
10,000 right-wing extremist crimes per year were ocially registered in Germany during the
period 1996 to 1999.2 More than 90 percent of these crimes were non-violent crimes, in
particular propaganda oences. Among violent crimes, 65 percent of the cases were hate
crimes against the foreign population. In the US, the FBI recorded about 8,000 right-wing
extremist crimes per year between 1998 and 2002. Great Britain has witnessed a dramatic
increase of this type of crime from 13,878 cases in 1998 to 54,370 cases in 2002 (Statistics
on Race and the Criminal Justice System). Similar numbers are available for other OECD
countries. While dierent classications and legislations make a cross country comparison
impossible, the numbers nonetheless demonstrate the severeness of the problem and the need
for a better understanding of its causes.
In Germany, the extent of right-wing extremist crimes is particularly problematic in East-
ern states, the former communist German Democratic Republic (GDR). During 1996 to 1999,
the indicence of right-wing extremist crimes was 50 percent higher in Eastern states as com-
pared to the Western states. In this paper we analyze two competing hypotheses for why the
incidence of right-wing crime is so much more pronounced in East Germany compared to West
Germany. According to the rst hypothesis, these dierences exist because of the politically
and educationally very dierent socialization between former communist East Germany and
democratic West Germany. These political and historical dierences and their dierent po-
litical cultures show up in dierent preferences between East and West German citizens also
after the German reunication (Alesina and Fuchs-Sch undeln, 2007). The political heritage
of the GDR may have generated more hostile attitudes towards immigrants and groups with
other ethnic origin. The second hypothesis stresses the particularly strong economic hardship
in East Germany, characterized not least by a substantially higher unemployment rate than
1In September 1991, asylum seekers were attacked in their home in Hoyerswerda. Similarly, in Rostock-
Lichtenhagen in August 1992, asylum seekers were attacked in pogrom-like riots. Lethal re assaults were
committed against Turkish foreigners in M olln (November 1992) and Solingen (May 1993).
2By way of comparison, there were about 6.5 million reported oences in the year 1997 overall, of which
about 12,000 had been classied as right-wing extremist crimes. Right-wing extremist crimes thus comprise
only a small fraction of all registered crimes.
2in the Western states. As an alternative explanation, higher unemployment in Eastern states
may be a major cause for the occurrence of right-wing extremist crime. In this paper we try
to discriminate these two explanations using crime statistics (\Polizeiliche Kriminalstatistik")
collected by the Federal Criminal Police Oce (\Bundeskriminalamt"). The argument that
unemployment may be an important driving force behind right-wing extremist sentiments is
prominent among historians. Several studies have argued that the rise of the Nazis in Germany
in the 1930s was decisively aected by the high unemployment rates (Fischer and Modigliani,
1978).3 This hypothesis is supported by an empirical analysis of voting behavior on the state
level by Frey and Weck (1981).4 A possible explanation for this relation is oered by relative
deprivation theory (Falter and Klein, 1994; Hofstadter, 1963; Lipset, 1963). According to this
theory unemployment or the threat of becoming unemployed causes a loss in status and feel-
ings of deprivation. As a consequence, people develop a preference for authoritarian leaders,
an anti-foreigner ideology, and violent predispositions.5 Despite its intuitive appeal, however,
previous emprical evidence on the relation between right-wing extremist crime, racist crime
and/or crime against immigrants on the one side and unemployment on the other side is rather
mixed (as we discuss below).6
In this study we explore the empirical relationship between unemployment and violent
and non-violent right-wing crimes in Germany. We use these nding to better understand
the sources of the higher incidence of right-wing extremist crimes in East Germany. Our
main results are as follows. First, we nd a signicantly positive relation between state level
unemployment and the incidence of right-wing extremist crimes. Importantly, this relation
3To illustrate: the unemployment rate was 14.4 percent in 1930, and the Nazi-party NSDAP (National
Socialist German Labor Party) received 18.3 percent of the votes in the elections for the German Reichstag. In
the elections of 1932, when unemployment had reached a level of 26.6 percent, 37.3 percent of the voters voted
in favor of the NSDAP. Note, however, that the political environment in Germany at the onset of the great
depression is hardly comparable to the current one. Hence a one-to-one comparison between now and then is
clearly problematic.
4It should be noted that, even though increasing unemployment may have causally aected the increasing
support for the Nazi party, this does not mean that the unemployed voted predominantely for the Nazis. In
fact, as shown in an interesting recent paper by King et al. (2008), the unemployed voted disproportionately for
the communist party.
5A related literature on subjective well being shows that unemployment signicantly reduces subjective well-
being (Clark and Oswald, 1994; Frey and Stutzer, 2002; Winkelmann and Winkelmann, 1998). Yang and Lester
(1994) even show that the suicide rate of unemployed in the U.S. is signicantly higher than the one of the
employed.
6On a more general level, most studies do nd a signicant association between unemployment and non-
violent forms of crime, but often no relation with violent forms of crime. See, inter alia, Raphael and Winter-
Ebmer (2001) for the US, Carmichael and Ward (2001) for the UK, Foug ere et al. (2009) for France, and Entorf
and Spengler (2000) for Germany. See also Freeman (1999) for a more general discussion of the economic
analysis of crime.
3turns out to be robust to the inclusion of state xed eects and state-specic time trends.
Second, we nd that a large fraction of the dierence in right-wing extremist crimes between
East and West Germany can be explained by the much higher unemployment rates in Eastern
states. In particular, we estimate the impact of unemployment on right-wing crime separately
for states with high and low incidence of unemployment and we nd a very similar impact
of unemployment on right-wing crime both in high-unemployment East German states and in
high-unemployment West German states. In contrast, we do not nd nd any such relationship
for low-unemployment states. Thus the relationship between unemployment and right-wing
extremist crimes is not a particular East German phenomenon. Instead, our estimates point to
the importance of non-linearities: the relationship between right-wing crimes and unemploy-
ment becomes relevant only once a critical level of unemployment has been exceeded. We also
study whether unemployment has dierential impacts on violent and non-violent right-wing
crimes. As laid out in more detail in the next section, these two categories comprise very dif-
ferent types of crime. For non-violent crimes, all results are very similar to the ones obtained
from analyzing the total incidence of crime, including the non-linearity in the impact of unem-
ployment. On the other hand, we do not nd a strong relationship between unemployment and
violent crimes. A nal interesting result shows that total unemployment predicts the incidence
of right-wing crime better than youth unemployment. Prima facie this nding is surprising
since right-wing criminals are typically young men between 15 and 25 years (Neubacher, 1998;
Willems et al., 1993). One could therefore expect that youth unemployment aects these crim-
inals more directly. However, unemployment may aect right-wing crime not (or not only) at
the individual level. In other words, crimes are not necessarily committed by those who are
actually unemployed and unemployment may thus aect right-wing crime in a more complex
way. One possible interpretation is that high unemployment increases the fear of losing a
job. This in turn may lower people's willingness to support humanitarian values of tolerance
and altruism. As a consequence, in a high-unemployment environment the normative pressure
against right-wing criminals may eradicate.
There are only few studies that support the hypothesis that current economic conditions,
such as unemployment, have a signcant impact on crimes motivated by right-wing extrem-
ist, anti-foreigner, or racist attitudes. One study that provides empirical support for such
a relationship is Dustmann et al. (2004) who investigate the determinants of racial harass-
ment in the UK. Using individual data with information on self-reported experience of racial
4harassment, they nd that minority individuals in high-unemployment neighborhoods are sig-
nicantly more frequently harassed. They argue that this could either indicate \(...) that
unemployment provokes greater hostility in the expression of negative attitudes or (...) it
puts a pool of unemployed individuals into contact with others in circumstances where hos-
tile outcomes can easily occur" (p.23). These results dier from those in Green et al. (1998)
who study the determinants of crimes against non-whites (Asian, Latinos, and blacks) in New
York City. They nd that racially motivated crimes are most frequent in predominantly white
areas and in areas that experienced strong in-migration of minorities. However, a higher local
unemployment rate among whites does not aect the incidence of such crimes nor is there an
interaction between high unemployment and high in-migration of minorities.7
To the best of our knowledge, the only study that empirically investigates the impact
of unemployment on right-wing extremist crime in recent Germany is Krueger and Pischke
(1997). They regress the incidence of anti-foreigner crimes in Germany on unemployment
rates in the period between 1991 and 1993. Lacking ocial data they collected county-level
crime data on these crimes based on newspaper reports. They report a signicant relation
between unemployment and crime incidents. This relation, however, becomes insignicant
after controlling for the dierences between East and West Germany. Several reasons may be
responsible for why their result diers from ours: rst, since they rely on newspaper data, the
precision of measurement is potentially questionable. Second, they analyze violent crimes only.
This is due to the fact that non-violent crimes are typically not reported in the newspapers.
In our data, which comprises violent and non-violent crimes, the incidence of violent crimes as
a fraction of all crimes is only about 6 percent in West Germany and about 9 percent in East
Germany. Our sample comprises 44,403 crimes in absolute terms, whereas the one of Krueger
and Pischke (1997) identied \only" 1,056 such crimes. Thus they analyze only a relatively
small proportion of all committed right-wing extremist crimes. Moreover, as our results show,
the association between violent crimes and unemployment is much weaker than for non-violent
crimes.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present the data and
some preliminary empirical evidence. We discuss our empirical strategy in section 3. In section
7See also Krueger and Male ckov a (2003) who investigate the link between poverty (or low education) and
politically motivated violence and terrorist activities. Using data on public opinion polls conducted in the West
Bank and Gaza Strip they nd that support for violent attacks against Israeli targets does not decrease among
those with higher education and higher living standards.
54 we present and discuss our empirical ndings. Section 5 concludes.
2 Data and descriptive evidence
To assess the role of unemployment on right-wing crime we use ocial crime statistics (\Polizei-
liche Kriminalstatistik"). The data have been collected by the Federal Criminal Police Oce
(\Bundeskriminalamt") and have not been analyzed previously. The data set uses information
reported by the police departments in the various German states (\L ander") on a monthly
basis.8 The variable to be explained is the number of registered right-wing extremist crimes
(REC) per 100,000 inhabitants. The Federal Criminal Police Oce classies right-wing ex-
tremist criminal activities in \violent right-wing extremist crimes" and \non-violent right-wing
extremist crimes". The former include oenses such as murder and attempted murder, bomb
and re attacks, assault and battery, oenses against the laws relating to civil disorders and
rioting. The latter include sedition, disruption of graveyard peace, threat/coercion, right-wing
extremist propaganda, willful damage to property, and so on. While our empirical analysis be-
low will concentrate on the role of unemployment as a determinant of total right-wing crimes,
we will also look separately at the two subcategories of non-violent and violent right-wing
crimes. The focus of our analysis is on the period from 1996 to 1999 for which consistent data
are available.9 More than 10,000 right-wing extremist crimes per year were ocially registered
within this period, of which 93.2% were non-violent and 6.8% were violent right-wing crimes.
Among non-violent RECs, 65% were right-wing propaganda delicts and \other" right-wing
extremist activities, and 35% of all non-violent crimes were hate crimes against foreigners and
crimes with anti-Semitic background. Among violent crimes, 65% of the cases were hate crimes
against immigrants.
Figure 1
8Ocial crime records are well known to be prone to measurement error (Skogan, 1974). The most obvious
problem is reporting behavior of victims. It could also be that what is classied as a right-wing extremist criminal
activity by the police varies across states and/or changes over time (e.g. as a consequence of increased media
attention). This is potentially important in the German case because the police falls under state responsibility
meaning that results may merely reect state-dierences in denitions and/or systematic changes in these
denitions over time (see also footnote 9 below).
9There are two important breaks in the data. First, until the end of 1995, both the Federal Criminal Police
Oce as well as the Federal Oce for the Protection of the Constitution (\Bundesverfassungsschutz") collected
data on REC. From 1996 onwards, both oces registered only those oences as REC which were reported
as such by the corresponding police authority of the involved state. Second, in an attempt to harmonize the
assessment and reporting of politically motivated oences across the states, there has been a major change in
the collection and registration of such crimes at the end of the 1990s. We therefore only analyze data from the
period 1996 until 1999.
6Panel (a) of Figure 1 reports the total number of registered right-wing extremist crimes
per 100,000 inhabitants and the overall unemployment rate in Germany over the period 1996
to 1999. Over this period, the total REC rate averaged about 1.4 crimes per 100,000 residents
and average total unemployment was about 12.7% in the same period. Panel (b) shows the
absolute number of non-violent and violent criminal activities. The total number of RECs
amounted to about 800 cases per month (1.4 cases per 100,000 residents) for non-violent RECs
and about 60 cases per month (0.1 cases per 100,000 residents) for violent RECs. While both
series show considerable uctuations over time, none of them has a clear underlying trend
within the observation period (note, however, that trending behavior of the unemployment
rate may be an issue).
Figure 2
Do the data suggest any systematic relationship between REC rates and unemployment
rates? Figure 2 gives a rst hint on this issue. In each panel, the vertical axis shows REC
rates per 100,000 residents and the horizontal axis refers to the unemployment rate. Panel
(a) pools all available month-state observations. This gure shows a clear positive correlation
between the unemployment rate and total REC rates. Panel (b) shows the aggregate time-
series relationship (i.e. each data point refers to the country-wide REC and unemployment
rates of a particular month), while panel (c) aggregates over time and shows the dierences in
REC and unemployment rates across states. Overall, Figure 2 displays a very clear picture:
Both time-series and cross-sectional variation indicate a clear positive relationship between the
two variables of interest.
Table 1
One issue that received considerable attention in the German public debate relates to the
question whether right-wing criminal activities are primarily a problem of the \new states",
the East German states that formed the communist Democratic Republic of Germany. The
issue here is to which extent the higher incidence of right-wing extremism in East Germany is
rooted in historical and political post-WWII dierences, and to which extent it is related to the
weak economic performance and, in particular, to the high unemployment rates in the East.
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on East-West dierences in unemployment and right-wing
extremist crimes. In fact, East-West dierences of right-wing extremist crimes are dramatic:
over the period 1996-1999, the total monthly REC rate in the Eastern states amounted to
72.575 per 100,000 residents, almost three times as high as in the Western states (0.914 crimes
per 100,000 residents). Furthermore, the fraction of violent crimes in total RECs was 9.2% in
East Germany, almost 1.5 times higher than in the West. Table 1 also shows the dierence in
total unemployment and youth unemployment between the new and the old states. East-West
dierences are also dramatic along this dimension. The average unemployment rate in the
Eastern states was 17.6%, which compares to 10.5% in Western states. Interestingly, with
respect to youth unemployment, East and West German states do not dier that much. The
mean youth unemployment rate of East German states over the observation period is 15.7%,
compared to 12.2% in the West.
3 Empirical strategy
The preceding evidence focuses exclusively on unconditional correlations between REC and
unemployment rates. It is clear, however, that not only levels of unemployment but also other
state-characteristics may play a potentially important role to explain the incidence of REC
rates across states and time. Our empirical analysis focuses on two basic models. The rst
model pools all data and runs a simple regression of the following form:
RECit =  +   URit + xit + "it; (1)
where RECit measures the number of right-wing crimes in state i in month t; URit is the
overall unemployment rate, and xit is a vector of (potentially) time-variant state characteristics.
The error term "it captures unobserved determinants of crime rates and measurement and/or
classication errors. The coecient  captures the impact of unemployment on crime and is
of primary interest. In order to rule out any spurious correlation that results from uctuations
in that variable across seasons, we use the seasonally adjusted unemployment rate throughout.
Finally, the vector of coecients  estimates the impact of other control variables on registered
crime rates.
Our second basic model controls for permanent dierences in REC rates across states and
for dierences in REC trends across states. Accounting for such dierences is potentially
important in the German case. On the one hand, the data are generated by reporting of
crimes to the police. Because the police in Germany is under state responsibility, observed
REC dierences may simply reect state-dierences in REC denitions or reporting and/or
8systematic changes in denitions and reporting over time. On the other hand, there are many
other dierences across states in Germany, particularly between Eastern and Western states
that could have led to dierential trends in REC-rates between states. To account in a exible
way for such state-dierences we estimate the following econcometric model:
RECit = i +   URit + it + 0
it2 + it (2)
This model allows for time-invariant state xed eects by estimating a set of state-specic
intercepts i. Moreover, it also adds state-specic quadratic time trends, captured by the
two parameter vectors i and 0
i. Note that model (2) does not acount for additional control
variables because the variables contained in xit have actually only little variation within states.
In other words, the eect of xit is essentially captured by state the xed eects i. The
parameter  now captures the eect of changes in the unemployment rate on right-wing crimes
within states. The error term it accounts for both time-variant unobserved heterogeneity and
measurement or classication errors. In comparison, model (2) oers two main advantages over
model (1). First, it accounts for unobserved heterogeneity across states in a very exible way.
Second, it takes the potential trending of the unemployment rate (see gure 1) into account
whereas model (1) neglects the longitudinal dimension in the data.
Note that both models represent associations at the level of the state, while the structural
model of interest is at the individual level. Therefore, both models are estimated by weighted
least squares, using the population size of the states as weights.10 In order to take potential
serial correlation of the error term into account { and Figure 1 suggests that serial correlation
may indeed be an issue { we use standard errors that are clustered at the state-level throughout,
allowing for arbitrary correlation of the regression errors within states.11 In the empirical
analysis below, we also present some additional model specications. First, we also estimate
the model in dierences, as Figure 1 suggests that unemployment might be characterized by
high temporal persistence. Second, we also estimate several dynamic variants of the model
10Weighting by the population size of the states is very natural when working with data that represent state-
specic averages (Wooldridge, 2008). However, the results do not hinge on using WLS instead of OLS (compare
columns (1) and (2) of table A.1).
11Columns (4) to (6) of table A.1 present alternative ways of dealing with serially correlated errors. It turns
out, however, that the exact way of dealing with this issue does not matter much. The model in the fourth
column uses quarterly data instead of monthly data. Next, column (5) shows estimates from a model with
AR(1) errors. Finally, we have re-estimated the baseline model by GMM. Clearly, using clustered standard
errors may yield conservative standard errors (compare the standard errors across columns (2) to (6) of Table
A.1, for example) and thus the reported standard errors are likely to provide an upper bound.
9given in equation (2). Dynamic models not only provide an alternative way of dealing with
serial correlation in the error term, they also allow us to test whether there is a lagged rather
than an immediate impact of unemployment on REC rates.
4 Empirical results
4.1 The relationship between unemplyoment and REC
Table 2 shows the impact of total unemployment on total REC rates under alternative spec-
ications in simple WLS regressions. The rst column of Table 2 shows the unemployment
coecient from a regression that does neither include control variables, nor state xed eects,
nor any deterministic time trend. This coecient indicates that an increase in the unemploy-
ment rate by one percentage point signicantly increases the number of total REC cases by
0.168 cases per 100,000 residents. Evaluated at sample averages, this implies an elasticity
of total RECs with respect to unemployment of 1.61 (= (0:168  10:820)=1:127). The second
column in Table 2 accounts for additional variables which may potentially aect right-wing
extremist crime. We include economic and demographic variables such as per-capita income,
education, the population share of young males and of foreigners, as well as urban and rural
population shares. We further control for policy variables such as crime conviction rates and
expenditures of regional governments for facilities and support of the young population, as
well as expenditures for social welfare.12 The goodness-of-t (adjusted R-squared) increases
strongly, from 0.511 without these regressors to 0.669 once these regressors are included. Fur-
thermore, the inclusion of these covariates decreases the point estimate of the unemployment
rate considerably, but the coecient is still highly signicant and quantitatively important,
with an implied elasticity at sample means of about 1.27 (= (0:132  10:820)=1:127).
Table 2
The coecients of the rst two columns in Table 2 are based on pooled data, i.e. on our
basic model given by equation (1). It is possible, however, that the unemployment coecient is
correlated with the error term as unobserved state-characteristics may aect both, unemploy-
12The full list of included control variables is as follows: Real per capita GDP, the fraction of the male
population that is aged between 15 and 25, the population share of foreigners, the fraction of the population
living in either small (less than 5,000 inhabitants) or large (more than 500,000 inhabitants) communities, the
fraction of school leavers with either \Hauptschulabschluss", \Realschulabschluss", or \ Fachhochschulreife",
the probability of conviction (for violent and non-violent crimes separately), real youth welfare service spending
per male inhabitant aged between 18 and 25, and real social welfare spending per capita.
10ment and REC rates. Futhermore, it turns out that the included control variables have very
little variation over time and most of their eect is identied from variation between states.
Given the limited within-state variation in control variables, column (3) reports the results of
the a xed eects model that does not include additional control variables. These xed-eects
pick up variation in REC rates that arise from time-invariant state-characteristics, for example
from dierences in reporting behavior to the police. The resulting unemployment coecient
is equal to 0.159. Notice also that the simple xed eects model performs better than the
pooled model with covariates: the adjusted R-squared increases from 0.663 to 0.751. Column
(4) extends this specication by additionally including state-specic quadratic time-trends.
This specication yields an unemployed coecient of 0.204. It also turns out that including
time-trends is important in terms of the fraction of explained variance, the adjusted R-squared
increases further to 0.805. The last two rows of Table 2 display the estimated (rst-order)
autocorrelation in the error term, using a simple regression-based test proposed in Wooldridge
(2008). While the estimated coecient is quite high in the pooled regressions, it drops strongly
when xed eects and state-specic time trends are included. In what follows, our empirical
analysis concentrates on the specication of column (4).
Table 3
Table 3 present the results from some additional model specications (the rst column
redisplays our preferred model from Table 2). First, we estimate the relation between REC
and unemployment in rst dierences, as unemployment may have quite some persistence (see
Figure 1 again). However, column (2) shows that very similar estimates result independent
of whether the model is estimated in dierences or in levels (as long as time trends are in-
cluded). The remaining six columns show several dynamic models, including either lags of
the dependent variable or lags of the unemployment rate. More specically, columns (4) to
(6) test for a lagged impact of the dependent variable. It turns out that both 3-months and
6-months lags do not have an important impact but that the 12-months lag does, suggesting
some seasonal pattern in REC rates (see Figure 1). This is underlined by the fact that the esti-
mated rst-order autocorrelation of the error term turns out to be insignicant in this specic
model. Nonetheless, estimating such a dynamic specication does not change the size nor the
statistical signicance of the unemployment coecient. Columns (7) to (9) add dierent lags
of the unemployment rate. It appears that the relation between unemployment and right-wing
crime is very immediate, as none of the lagged unemployment coecients turns out to be sta-
11tistically signicant. Finally, including dierent lags of both the dependent variable and the
unemployment rate at the same time yields qualitatively the same results, as shown in the nal
column. In sum, the additional results of Table 3 suggest that the impact of unemployment
on right-wing extremist crimes is quite robust. Unemployment seems to have a signcantly
positive and quantitatively important impact on right-wing extremist crimes.
To get a sense of the quantitative importance of the estimates, let us calculate the eects on
the total REC rate predicted by a one-standard-deviation increase in the unemployment rate,
using the unemployment coecient of the model shown in column (4) of Table 2 as benchmark.
The overall standard deviation in observed unemployment rates amounts to 3.732. This implies
that the impact on total REC rates predicted by such a change in the unemployment rate
equals 0.761 (= 0:204  3:732). This compares to an observed standard deviation of total REC
rates of 0.874. Hence we reach the conclusions that increasing the unemployment rate by one
standard deviation predicts an increases on total REC rates equal to 87% of the standard
deviation of REC rates observed in the data. In any event, this suggests a very close link
between unemployment and REC rates. However, we also acknowledge that there remain
some potential problems as regards identication and that we can not denitely settle the
causality issue.13
4.2 Accounting for REC-dierences between East and West Germany
An important issue in the German public debate has been whether the higher incidence of
right-wing extremism in East Germany is a phenomenon related to particular historical or
political circumstances; or whether this is due to the worse economic conditions in East Ger-
many, in particular with respect to unemployment. Individuals in East Germany grew up in a
communist political system while West Germans experienced democracy and a social market
economy. This political history and the associated dierences in political cultures may have
strongly aected the preferences and attitudes of individuals in the two regions even after the
re-unication of the country (Alesina and Fuchs-Sch undeln, 2007). The absence of political
participation under the communist regime may have led East Germans to distrust their own
13Specically, the unemployment rate and the error term could be correlated for several distinct reasons.
For example, it may be the case that law enforcement increases in states where unemployment increases which
would induce correlation between the unemployment rate and the error term (one could also argue the other
way around, however). We also note, however, that studies that instrument for the unemployment rate suggest
that such eects may have only a minor impact; see Raphael and Winter-Ebmer (2001) or Foug ere et al. (2009),
for example.
12government and undermined democratic and liberal thinking. This may well have made East
Germans more receptive for extremist \ideologies" and activities. A second explanation em-
phasizes the particular economic problems to which East Germans are exposed. The process
of transition from a socialist to a market economy that has begun with the fall of the Iron
Curtain and the German reunication of the early 1990s imposed particular hardship on many
individuals in East Germany. As a result of job loss and unemployment, many individuals
found themselves { at least in relative terms { as economic losers. Unemployment is associated
with occupational downgrading, loss of human capital, and little hope for rapid and signicant
improvement. The particularly bad labor market conditions in East Germany may have gen-
erated a social climate conducive to right-wing criminal activities. According to this view, the
high unemployment rates in the East, rather than other specic circumstances not necessarily
related to the labor market, explain the dierence in the incidence of RECs between the old
and the new states.
In what follows we use the above results to shed light on this issue. We take as a benchmark
the results from our preferred specication (as given in column (4) of Table 2). Assuming
that this model is a reasonable description of the relation between REC and unemployment,
we can decompose the observed REC-dierences between East and West Germany into (i) a
component that is due to dierences in unemployment and (ii) a component that is due to other
(observed and unobserved) dierences between the two regions. In other words, we use our
estimated coecient for the following thought experiment: to which level would East German
REC rates decrease, would unemployment rates in East-Germany go down to West-German
levels? The East-West dierence in total REC rates amounts to 1.741 (= 2.570 - 0.824) and
the dierence in average unemployment rates amounts to 8.062 percentage points (see Table
1). Using our benchmark estimates, the predicted reduction in REC rates would amount to
1.645 (= 0:204  8:062). In other words, about 64% of the observed REC-dierence between
East and West Germany can be attributed to dierences in unemployment.
Table 4
In Table 4 we analyze in more detail the origins of East-West dierences in REC rates. For
instance, it could be that RECs in East Germany react more strongly to changes in unemploy-
ment than in West Germany. Alternatively, there could be non-linearities in the relationship
between unemployment and crime. One explanation for such a non-linear relationship may be
related to the enforcement of social norms. The hypothesis is that right-wing extremist crime
13is an interactive process between right-wing extremist criminals and a majority of witnesses
who fail to enforce social norms against racist and anti-foreigner violence. If a critical level of
unemployment is reached, this willingness to enforce norms decreases disproportionately.14
To explore this hypothesis further, Table 4 proceeds in the following way (for comparison
reasons, the rst column repeats the unemployment coecient of our baseline specication).
First, in column (2), we introduce an interaction eect between a dummy variable indicating
an Eastern state and the unemployment rate. This allows us to test for dierences in the
strength of the unemployment-REC relationship between the two regions. It turns out that
the point estimate of the interaction eect is positive and quantitatively large { indicating that,
indeed, the incidence of RECs in East Germany increases more strongly to a given change in
the unemployment rate. However, the estimated eect is not statistically signicant. We then
proceed by checking whether there are non-linearities in the relationship between unemploy-
ment and REC rates: at modest levels of unemployment, right-wing criminal activities may be
low and almost unrelated to rates of unemployment but once a critical level of unemployment
has been reached, a further increase in unemployment strongly increases right-wing criminal
activities. In fact, Figure 2 suggests there may be non-linearities: it appears as if there is only
a weak correlation at low unemployment levels but a strong one at higher levels. Column (3) of
Table 4 therefore allows for dierential eects of unemployment on right-wing extremist crime
under high-unemployment and low-unemployment circumstances. To this end we include a
dummy variable, 1(URit > URit), in the regression that takes the value 1 if unemployment
in state i and month t is above the mean unemployment rate observed in the whole sample
(equal to 10.82%). We then interact this dummy with the dierence between the observed and
the mean umployment rate. This spline-specication allows for a piecewise linear relationship
between the unemployment rate and REC. In particular, we can test whether the relationship
between unemployment and REC rates becomes stronger when unemployment exceeds its av-
erage value. The estimates reported in Table 4 support the explanation based on a non-linear
impact of unemployment on REC. When unemployment falls short of the average unemploy-
ment, a one percentage point increase in the unemployment rate does hardly aect total REC
rates (the corresponding point estimate is very small, -0.002, and does not reach statistical
14As an extreme example, we refer to the riots in the cities of Rostock and Hoyerswerda (in former East
Germany in 1991, mentioned in footnote 1), where foreigners were collectively attacked for several consecutive
days. Many residents who witnessed the riot did not only tolerate the violence, but actually supported it by
clapping and yelling.
14signicance). In contrast, if unemployment is above average, a one percentage point increase
in the unemployment rate increases REC rates by 0.249 (= 0:251   0:002).
Finally, let us make a similar thought experiment as above but now using the estimates of
column (3) of Table 4. Bringing down the Eastern unemployment rate down to the Western
unemployment rate, which requires a reduction in unemployment of 6.682 percentage points to
the average unemployment rate and further 1.38 percentage points to the Western rate, would
lead to an estimated reduction in Eastern REC rates of 1.591 (= (17:502 10:820)( 0:251 
0:002) + 0:329   (10:820   9:440)  ( 0:002)) cases per 100,000 residents. In other words, the
estimated eects column (3) of Table 4 suggests that the East-West gap in unemployment rates
explains about 78% of the dierence in REC in this hypothetical scenario.
4.3 Extensions
Non-violent versus violent right-wing extremist crimes
The preceding results all relate to the incidence of total right-wing extremist crimes, i.e. to
both non-violent and violent crimes. As mentioned before, however, these two categories
comprise very dierent types of crimes. A separate analysis is therefore quite important for a
better understanding and an assessment of the costs of right-wing extremist crimes to society.
Table 5 addresses this issue by showing respective results once REC rates are dierentiated by
non-violent and violent crimes.
Table 5
The left panel of Table 5 shows estimates of the impact of unemployment on violent RECs
and the right panel shows analogous estimates for non-violent RECs. First, notice that the
estimated coecient is smaller in absolute value in the violent REC regressions. This is due
to the fact that violent crimes are less than 10% of all crimes.15 For violent crimes, the
pooled model without co-variates shows a signicant coecient, which becomes insignicant
once we control for state xed eects and state-specic trends. Again it may be interesting to
consider possible non-linearities as before for total crime rates. This is done in column (3) of
Table 5. In contrast to overall crimes, violent crimes do not seem to be signicantly aected
by unemployment. While the corresponding point estimate indicates a steeper slope once
15Note, however, that in terms of severeness and damage a violent crime is much worse than a non-violent
one.
15unemployment exceeds the average unemployment rate (as indicated by the positive coecient
of the interaction term), this eect is not statistically signicant. This result resembles the one
obtained by Krueger and Pischke (1997), who report no signicant impact of unemployment
on predominantly violent right-wing extremist crimes for Germany in the early 1990s.
With respect to non-violent RECs (the right panel of Table 5) the picture resembles very
closely the one obtained for total REC rates. Columns (4) and (5) show that the coecient on
unemployment estimated from the pooled model without control variables is highly statistically
signicant, albeit somewhat smaller in size than in the total REC regressions. It becomes
somewhat larger once we allow for state-xed eects and state-specic time trends. Allowing
for dierent unemployment coecients for high- and low-unemployment environments yields
essentially the same picture as in the total REC regressions: unemployment has a strong
impact when unemployment is high but it does not aect REC-incidence at lower levels of
unemployment.
Youth unemployment versus total unemployment
One could argue that a large pool of unemployed individuals implies a large pool of potential
committers of right-wing extremist crimes. Provided that the experience of unemployment
induces individuals to commit right-wing criminal activities, one would expect that youth
unemployment { rather than total unemployment { is a better measure for the potential impact
of unemployment on crime. To examine this hypothesis, we rerun some of the key regressions
of Tables 2 and 4 with the youth unemployment rather than the total unemployment rate as
the explanatory variable (see Table 6). In all other respects, the regressions are identical.
Table 6
The rst two columns in Table 6 report the unemployment coecients for the basic model
given by equation (2) and for the extended model that allows for dierences in unemployment
rates between high/low unemployment regions and East/West. A clear picture emerges from
these results: the youth unemployment rate (YUR) does not have a signicant impact on REC
rates. All YUR-coecients of Table 6 are insignicant. Allowing for heterogenous unemploy-
ment eects yields a qualitatively similar picture as above. However, the youth unemployment
coecients are quantitatively much smaller and statistically insignicant. When we include the
overall unemployment rate in addition to the youth unemployment rate, however, it turns out
16that the overall unemployment rate remains highly signicant and of quantitative magnitude
comparable to the previous estimates while the youth unemployment rate remains statistically
insignicant (the point estimate becomes even negative). As an alternative specication we
included the youth unemployment rate relative to the overall unemployment as an indicator
of the prevalence of youth unemployment problems. Again, it turns out that overall unem-
ployment is the dominant variable whereas the ratio of youth unemployment relative to total
unemployment is insignicant. Obviously, the relationship between unemployment and RECs
is not a simple one. An explanation that rests upon the hypothesis that higher unemployment
increases the pool of potential committers does not seem to be supported by the data. As
committers of RECs are typically younger individuals, the above hypothesis is certainly not
consistent with the weak/absent eect of youth unemployment on RECs reported in Table 5.
We will come back to this issue in the nal section.
5 Conclusions
The above evidence on right-wing crime suggests a strong and systematic relationship between
regional unemployment and the occurrence of right-wing activity. First, we nd a signicantly
positive relation between state level unemployment and the incidence of right-wing extremist
crimes. The relation remains signicant once we control for state xed eects and state-specic
time trends and take serial correlation of the error term into account. Second, we nd that
the dramatic dierences in right-wing extremist crimes between East and West Germany can
be explained almost entirely by the gap in unemployment rates between the two regions. This
conclusion is further strengthened by the result that the relationship between unemployment
and right-wing extremist crime is non-linear. At low levels of unemployment, a one-percentage
point increase in the unemployment rate has a very small and statistically insignicant eect
on the incidence of right-wing extremist crimes. In contrast, at high levels of unemployment
this relationship becomes very strong. This suggests that right-wing extremist activities may
become particularly problematic once unemployment has reached some critical level. It is
an interesting possibility that a non-linear relationship may be related to the enforcement of
social norms. The hypothesis is that right-wing extremist crimes is an interactive process
between active right-wing extremist criminals and passive witnesses (family, friends, society in
general) who fail to enforce social norms against racist and anti-foreigner violence. When one's
17willingness to enforce norms is inuenced by own unemployment experience (or the fear to lose
the job) high unemployment leads these norms to erode. Moreover, when a critical mass of
individuals who are unwilling to actively support the social norm exists, right-wing extrimists
may be disproportionately encouraged to commit hate crimes.
Our empirical analysis also reveals a dierential impact of unemployment on violent and
non-violent right-wing crimes, two categories that comprise of very dierent types of crimes.
For non-violent crimes, our results are very similar to the ones obtained from analyzing the total
incidence of crime, including the non-linearity in the impact of unemployment. In contrast, we
do not nd a strong relationship between unemployment and violent crime. A nal interesting
result shows that total unemployment predicts the incidence of right-wing crime better than
youth unemployment. Prima facie this nding is surprising since right-wing criminals are
typically young men between 15 and 25 years (Neubacher, 1998; Willems et al., 1993).
In sum, our empirical evidence suggests a systematic eect of regional unemployment on
right-wing extremist criminal activities. The estimated eect is statistically highly signicant
and quantitatively large. Notice, however, that our results do not (or not necessarily) imply
that those who are actually unemployed are more likely to commit right-wing extremist crimes.
This view is supported by our nding that - despite the fact that most crimes are committed
by young men - youth unemployment has a much weaker eect on right-wing crimes than total
unemployment. In our view high regional unemployment aects right-wing crime in a rather
complex way, in particular it aects not only those who are currently unemployed. It seems
very likely that living in a region with a high unemployment rate increases the fear of losing
a job. This fear may negatively aect attitudes towards foreigners, creating a demand for
scapegoats and lowering people's willingness to enforce norms and to support humanitarian
values of tolerance and altruism. As a consequence anti foreigner resentments develop and the
normative pressure against committing right-wing crime eradicates.16
As an example, we refer to the riots in the cities of Rostock and Hoyerswerda (in former
East Germany in 1991, mentioned in footnote 1), where foreigners were collectively attacked
for several consecutive days. Many residents who witnessed the riot, did not only tolerate
the violence but actually supported it by clapping and yelling. This example illustrates that
right-wing crime is an interactive process. It requires not only psychopathic people who are
16Sampson et al. (1997) use a similar argument, namely that social cohesion among neighbors is linked to
the incidence of violence. Their empirical analysis shows that dierent measures of social cohesion are indeed
correlated with variation in violence.
18ready to lay violent hands on others (and who need not necessarily be unemployed) but also the
majority of witnesses who fail to enforce social norms against (anti-foreigner) violence. If high
unemployment rates reduce this willingness to enforce norms, unemployment may therefore be
associated with right-wing crime, even though the actual criminals are not unemployed.17
17In fact, the available evidence based on individual data lends no (or only weak) support to the hypothesis
that unemployed individuals are more likely to engage in right-wing extremist activities. Wahl (2001, 2003),
for example, concludes that there is only a weak indication that individual unemployment is a key factor for
committing right-wing extremist crimes. Bacher (2001a,b) studies attitudes towards foreigners and Jews in
Germany and nds that unemployment seems to activate and enforce existing latent anti-foreigner predisposi-
tions. Fertig and Schmidt (2002) nd only a small or insignicant impact of being unemployed or being afraid
of losing a job on attitudes towards foreigners. Gang et al. (2002) identify the degree of competition in the
labor market with immigrants as a major factor of negative attitudes towards immigrants, but they do not
nd any signicant dierence between employed and unemployed was detected. Bauer et al. (2000) nd that
being unemployed does not signicantly change natives' answers to the question whether immigration should
be reduced. The evidence presented in Siedler (2006), however, suggests that young Germans are more likely
to develop right-wing extremist and xenophobic attitudes if their parents experienced unemployment.
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22Table 1: Right-wing extremist crime and unemployment in East and West Germany, 1996-1999
West
Germany
East
Germany Total Dierence
Total right-wing extremist crime (REC) rate 0:829 2:570 1:127 1:741
(0:381) (1:118) (0:874) (0:332)
Violent crimes as fraction of total REC 0:057 0:087 0:062 0:030
(0:042) (0:061) (0:047) (0:019)
Unemployment rate (UR) 9:440 17:502 10:820 8:061
(2:243) (1:758) (3:732) (0:946)
Youth unemployment rate (YUR) 10:653 15:482 11:480 4:829
(3:277) (1:799) (3:572) (1:198)
Number of observations 528 240 768 768
Notes: Total REC rate corresponds to the total registered rightist extremist crimes per 100,000 inhabitants.
Youth unemployment rate refers to persons below age 25 only. The two unemployment rates are seasonally
adjusted. All table entries are weighted by the population size of the states. Standard deviations (columns (1)
to (3)) and standard errors (nal column) in parentheses, respectively. Standard errors are in the last column
are adjusted for clustering at the state level.
23Table 2: Unemployment and RECs
Dependent variable: REC Total
Mean 1.127
Standard deviation 0.874
UR 0:168 0:132 0:159 0:204
(0:032)??? (0:045)?? (0:070)?? (0:079)??
Controls No Yes No No
State xed eects No No Yes Yes
State-specic trends No No No Yes
Constant  0:686 14:329  1:165  1:040
(0:327)? (5:363)?? (1:192) (1:140)
Observations 768 768 768 768
R2 0:511 0:669 0:756 0:817
Adjusted R2 0:511 0:663 0:751 0:805
Coecient on lagged ^  0:719 0:584 0:420 0:234
(0:026)??? (0:031)??? (0:034)??? (0:037)???
Notes:
?,
??,
??? denotes statistical signicance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.
All regressions are estimated by WLS, using the population size of the states as weights.
Robust standard errors are given in parentheses and are clustered at the state level.
The full list of control variables is given in footnote 12. The coecient on lagged ^  is
the estimated slope parameter from a regression of ^ it on ^ it 1.
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25Table 4: Unemployment and RECs: Non-linearities
Dependent variable: REC Total
Mean 1.127
Standard deviation 0.874
UR 0:204 0:127
(0:079)?? (0:163)
UR  East 0:097
(0:186)
(UR   UR)  0:002
(0:109)
1(UR > UR)  0:329
(0:069)???
(UR   UR)  1(UR > UR) 0:251
(0:142)?
Constant  1:040  1:329 1:811
(1:140) (1:293) (0:170)???
Observations 768 768 768
R2 0:817 0:817 0:819
Adjusted R2 0:805 0:805 0:806
Coecient on lagged ^  0:234 0:236 0:233
(0:037)??? (0:037)??? (0:037)???
Notes:
?,
??,
??? denotes statistical signicance at the 10%, 5%, 1%
level, respectively. All regressions are estimated by population-weighted
least squares including state xed eects, and state-specic quadratic time-
trends. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the state level.
UR corresponds to the average unemployment rate. 1() denotes the indi-
cator function. The coecient on lagged ^  is the estimated slope parameter
from a regression of ^ it on ^ it 1.
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28Figure 1: Right-wing extremist crimes and unemployment, Germany 01.1996-12.1999
1
1
1
2
1
3
1
4
1
5
1
6
1
7
(
d
e
−
s
e
a
s
o
n
e
d
)
 
U
n
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
 
r
a
t
e
0
.
5
1
1
.
5
2
T
o
t
a
l
 
R
E
C
 
c
r
i
m
e
 
r
a
t
e
Jan96 Jul96 Jan97 Jul97 Jan98 Jul98 Jan99 Jul99 Jan00
Right−wing extremist crimes
per 100,000 residents
(unweighted avg. by states)
Unemplomyent rate
(unweighted avg. by states)
(a) Right-wing extremist crime rate and unemployment rate
0
2
0
0
4
0
0
6
0
0
8
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
2
0
0
N
o
n
−
v
i
o
l
e
n
t
 
c
r
i
m
e
s
0
5
0
1
0
0
1
5
0
2
0
0
V
i
o
l
e
n
t
 
c
r
i
m
e
s
Jan96 Jul96 Jan97 Jul97 Jan98 Jul98 Jan99 Jul99 Jan00
Violent REC crimes Non−violent REC crimes
(b) Absolute number of violent and non-violent right-wing extremist
crimes
29Figure 2: Total right-wing extremist crime versus unemployment
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30Figure 3: Total right-wing extremist crime and unemployment, East versus West Germany
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